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1 
INTRODUCTION 
Harmonisation of laws has received considerable 
attention recently in New Zealand with respect to 
the Australian New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
Trade Agreement (CER). The Agreement and in 
particular the 1988 Memorandum of Understanding on 
the Harmonisation of Business Law have altered the 
context of business law reform in New Zealand. The 
aim of this paper is to put the debate into 
perspective and to suggest that a limited, 
conceptually certain view of harmonisation is the 
best way to achieve the goals of harmonisation. 
To put the debate into perspective, the historical 
background of the Agreement and some of the overseas 
harmonisation experiences will be examined. In New 
Zealand there has been considerable discussion of 
harmonisation by academic writers, interest groups 
and governmental and non-governmental agencies. A 
review of this discussion and an examination of some 
of the more important statements in it will be made. 
Central to this discussion is the Report To 
Governments - By Steering Committee Of Officials.
1 
Finally, I will attempt to give an alternative model 
of 'harmonisation'. 
1 Steering Committee of Officials Report to 
Governments - By Steering Committee of Officials 
Wellington, June 1990. 
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BACKGROUND 
The idea of freer trade between Australia and New 
Zealand is not new. In 1906 a "reciprocal 
preferential trading arrangement" was prepared by 
the two countries' Prime Ministers; though the New 
Zealand Parliament refused to ratify it. 2 The first 
real attempt at free trade was the New Zealand 
Australia Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1965. The 
goal of that Agreement was free trade but the 
reality was somewhat more limited. 3 The Agreement 
has been described as "the culmination of a period 
of rather unsatisfactory relationships between 
Australia and New Zealand 11 • 4 The free trade was 
limited to items in a schedule to the Agreement. 
The most important of which was forest products. 
Though there was provision made for adding to the 
list, virtually nothing was added which competed 
with New Zealand businesses. 5 Lloyd is critical of 
NAFTA as a free trade agreement. He suggests that 
although the value of trans-Tasman trade quadrupled 
between 1965 and 1978, the effect of NAFTA was 
2 Keith Sinclair (ed) Tasman Relations, Auckland 
University Press, 1987, 144, P J Lloyd 
3 The objectives were stated in Article 2 which 
read 
(a) to further the development of the Area and the 
use of the resources of the Area by promoting a 
sustained and mutually beneficial expansion of 
trade; 
(b) to ensure as far as possible that trade within 
the Area takes place under conditions of fair 
competition. 
(c) to contribute to the harmonious development and 
expansion of world trade and the progressive 
removal of barriers thereto. 
4 Sir Frank Holmes New Zealand, ANZCERTA and 
ASEAN, address to the First ASEAN Economic 
Congress, p2. 
5 Above n2, pl48. 
"slight 11 • 6 He points out that there were many 
factors at work and that the proportion of New 
Zealand's total imports which came from Australia 
remained (subject to annual variations) at about 
20-25 per cent. 7 
3 
The Agreement did show that free trade was possible. 
Sir Frank Holmes noted8 
[o]verall, the, NAFTA with only limited 
liberalisation between the partners and in 
overall trade policy, may have been 
helpful in orientating more manufacturers 
towards exporting, especially to 
Australia. But it had limited 
significance, other than as a stepping 
stone to a more comprehensive change of 
policy. By the early BO's enough New 
Zealand manufacturers had succeeded in 
competition with Australians to make a 
genuine free trade area a political 
possibility. 
A change was necessary to achieve this. New 
Zealands general economic policy had been 
isolationist. Import licensing had been in place 
since 1938 which had sheltered New Zealand 
manufacturers from competition. New Zealands import 
licensing had been one of the factors which had 
limited free trade under NAFTA as they made 
Australia reluctant to give significant tariff 
concessions. 9 
Any new agreement would have to deal with import 
licensing and ensure that progress could not easily 
be stalled. 
6 Above n2, pl51. 
7 Idem. 
8 Above n4, p3. 
9 Above n2, pl46. 
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For New Zealand, the rationale behind CER was clear. 
Prime Minister David Lange said10 
[l]ife in the global market place is hard 
for the small guy. Size makes a 
difference. A country going it alone with 
only 3 million people is going uphill all 
the way. It doesn't take lateral thinking 
to tell you that our chances are better as 
part of an Australasian economy with a 
population based on 18 million people. 
Australia is much more important to New Zealand as a 
trading partner than New Zealand is for Australia.
11 
Nevertheless, New Zealand is a significant market 
for Australia. New Zealand is the largest export 
market for Australian manufacturers.
12 
For Australia there are also strategic concerns. As 
James notes "Australia would regard with horror a 
hostile force or government on its south-eastern 
flank. 1113 Sir Owen Woodhouse notes the "wider 
defence and economic purposes of providing a focus 
of strength and stability for the whole region.
1114 
10 R Rickets (ed) Closer Economic Relations and 
Beyond: Seminars for the NZIIA Conference, 
23 August 1988. Forward by Rt Hon David Lange, 
pvl. 
11 Above nlO, pl per D Caygill. New Zealand 
receives 5.3% of Australias exports and 
Australia receives 16.6% of New Zealands. 
12 Idem. 
13 Colin James The Tasman Connection: A New Path. 
A discussion paper prepared for the Australia 
New Zealand Foundation, January 1982, p21. 
14 Address by Sir Owen Woodhouse to the 
Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference 
September 1988. Extracts reprinted in Law 
Commission Report No. 5 Annual Report 1988. 
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The objectives of the Agreement are15 
(a) to strengthen the prouder relationship between 
New Zealand and Australia; 
(b) to develop closer economic relations between 
the Member States through a mutually beneficial 
expansion of free trade between New Zealand and 
Australia; 
(c) to eliminate barriers to trade between 
Australia and New Zealand in a gradual and 
progressive manner under an agreed timetable 
with a minimum of disruption; 
(d) to develop trade between New Zealand and 
Australia under conditions of fair competition. 
One of the goals of the Agreement is clearly free 
trade; though the Agreement's goals are not limited 
to free trade. 
Initially Australia had proposed a form of economic 
union and had then suggested a customs union. A 
customs union involves (amongst other things) a 
common external tariff which was unacceptable 
because of New Zealand's manufacturers' reliance on 
cheap imported componentry free trade became the 
objective of the new Agreement. This was achieved 
five years ahead of the original date for the final 
removal of import licensing on 1 July 1990.
16 Anti 
dumping was dealt with by Article 4 of the Protocol 
of Goods. Existing regulation was removed, with 
respect to trans-Tasman trade, from 1 July 1990 and 
15 Article 1 of the Agreement. 
16 Agreed Documents from 1988 Review of ANZCERTA 
protocol on acceleration of Free Trade of 
Goods, Articles. 
is now subject to the general competition laws of 
the importing nation. 17 
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One area where there has been little progress is 
investment. Australia has a "Treaty of Friendship 
and Co-operation" with Japan (it has the acronym 
NARA) which grants Japan sort of a most favoured 
nation status. Australia is required to give Japan 
the same investment rights (amongst other things) 
that they give any other country.
18 New Zealand has 
pushed quite hard on free investment. Mike Moore as 
Minister of External Relations and Trade said "it is 
one of the big things New Zealand wants out of 
CER 11 • 19 Australia appear to be unlikely to enter 
into a reciprocal free investment agreement
20 , 
though are officially giving the matter on-going 
consideration. 21 
Harmonisation - The Framework 
Article 22 3 (c) of the Agreement provides that 
[t]he Member Status shall undertake a 
general review of this Agreement in 1988. 
Under the general review the Member 
Status shall consider ... 
(C) the need for changes in Government 
economic policies and practices, in such 
fields as taxation, company law and 
standards and for changes in policies and 
practices affecting the other Member State 
concerning such factors as foreign 
investment, movement of people, tourism, 
17 Though competition laws have been altered to 
accommodate the trans-Tasman market. See the 
Commerce Amendment Act 1990. 
18 Above no. 10, plS, Peter Fairfax. 
19 The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, May 25 
1990, p9. 
20 Idem. 
21 Above nlO, p23, Sir Frank Holmes. 
and transport, 
reached in the 
relationship. 
to reflect the stage 
closer economic 
One of the Agreed Documents from the 1988 general 
review was a Memordandum of Understanding on 
Business Law. 
Memorandum 
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This Memorandun records the following understandings reached in discussions between 
the Goverrrnent of New Zealand and the Goverrrnent of Australia regarding promotion of 
closer economic relations between New Zealand and Australia:-
Mutual benefits to be obtained by the two countries 
1. Both Goverrvnents recognise the irrportance of accelerating, deepening and widening 
the relationship that has developed through the growth of trans-Tasman trade since 
the coomencement of the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations - Trade 
Agreement which came into force in 1983. 
2. Both Goverrvnents also recognise that differences in the laws and regulatory 
practices relating to business may irrpede the enhancement of this relationship by 
inhibiting the creation of an envirorvnent conducive to the growth of trade in 
goods and services and the efficiency of both economies. 
3. The further harmonisation of s i gn i f i cant areas of business law and regulation can 
be of rrutual benefit to both countries. Such harmonisation can advance the 
development of free trade and coomerce between the two countries and facilitate 
the development of the efficiency and COOl)etitiveness of both countries in 
relation to international markets. 
Existing business law harmonisation 
4. Starting from their similar legal and coomercial backgrounds, New Zealand and 
Australia have already achieved a significant degree of harmonisation and co-
operation in a nuii:>er of areas of business law, including: 
(a) restrictive trade practices laws administered by the Coomerce C011111ission in 
New Zealand and the Trade Practices C011111ission in Australia; 
(b) co-operation in relation to business law and consuner affairs through the 
Standing C011111ittee of Attorneys-General and the Standing C011111ittee of Consuner 
Affairs Ministers; 
(c) pre-sale consuner protection; 
(d) co-operation between the Securities C011111ission in New Zealand and the National 
COfllx!nies and Securities C011111ission in Australia on the admission of share 
prospectuses; 
(e) intellectual property law. 
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Further development of business law harmonisation 
5. It is desirable that the process of harmonisation and co-operation be continued 
with a view to achieving a rrutually beneficial trans-Tasman coornercial 
environnent, including the removal of any irrpediments to trade that may arise out 
of differences between business laws and regulatory practices of the two 
countries. To this end both Governnents will examine the scope for harmonisation 
of business law and regulatory practices, including the removal of any irrpediments 
that are identified, in accordance with a program to be established. This program 
will include the following areas: 
(a) CCJl!l)anies, securities and futures laws, including: 
Ci) cross-recognition of essential elements of corporate status, including 
registration ('one place of registration'), and capacity and powers of 
corporations; 
(ii) share capital requirements, including in relation to share bJy-backs 
and no-par value shares; 
( i ii) 
C iv) 
(V) 
(Vi) 
(vii) 
C viii) 
( i X) 
(x) 
fund raising, including recognition of prospectuses, regulation of 
unit trusts and other investment schemes; 
registration of charges; 
disclosure of CCJl!l)any operations, accounts and shareholding interests; 
corporate governance; 
takeover law; 
insolvency; 
securities industry regulation, including stock market rules, insider 
trading, transfer and settlement systems and licensing requirements; 
futures industry regulation; 
(b) c~tition law, including in particular reliance on c~tition law to 
redress predatory trade between both countries; 
Cc) consuner protection, particularly with respect to post-sale consuner 
protection, and consuner credit laws; 
Cd) copyright law, including support of appropriate international conventions, and 
the protection of c~ter software and integrated ...... ; 
(e) coornercial arbitration; 
(f) the law relating to the sale of goods and services between the two countries; 
(g) rrutual assistance between regulatory agencies in the acininistration and 
enforcement of business laws; 
(h) further recognition and reciprocal enforcement of court decisions in each 
country, including enforcement of injunctions, orders for specific performance 
and revenue judgments. 
6. The two Governnents will keep the program urder review and make such variations to 
the program as are rrutually decided. 
7. When either Governnent considers that a difference between their respective 
business laws or regulatory practices gives rise to an irrpediment to trade, and 
requests consultations, the two Governnents will consult with a view to resolving 
the irrpediment, whether the area of law is already included on the program and 
regardless of the priority accorded to the matter at the time. 
8. Both Goverrments recognise that effective harmonisation does not require 
replication of laws, although that may be appropriate in some cases. 
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9. Each Goverrment will keep the other Goverrment informed of proposed reforms in the 
business law area and, where feasible and appropriate, will consult on the 
harmonisation of the laws in question. 
10. Each Goverrment will take the necessary steps to facilitate prorrpt examination of 
the areas of business law and regulatory practices contained in the program to be 
established. The examination process is to include consultation with the business 
COllll'U'lity and other relevant interests in both countries. 
11. Both Goverrments will seek to corrplete the examination of relevant law and 
practices, and to identify areas appropriate for harmonisation, by 30 June 1990. 
12. The understandings set out in this Memorandun are not intended to preclude the 
taking of any other steps; through Ministerial forums and otherwise, to achieve 
the earlier harmonisation of any area of business law or regulatory practice. 
Coornencement and inplementation 
13. The Minister of Justice of Hew Zealand and the Attorney-General of Australia will 
have responsibility on behalf of their respective Goverrments for the 
implementation of this Memorand1.111 of Understanding including the establishment, 
and any variation of, the program. 
14. This Memorand1.111 of Understanding will come into effect on the date of its 
signature. 
To meet the requirements of paragraph 11 of the 
Memorandum, the bilateral Steering Committee 
referred to above 22 was formed. The report in a 
section headed "Definition of the Task" notes that 
the objective of their report is harmonisation and 
that the removal of impediments to trade is an 
aspect of this. 23 It notes that few of the laws 
listed in the Memorandum create an impediment. The 
report goes on to state24 
[t]he MOU identifies the objective of the 
harmonisation process as being the 
creation of a mutually beneficial 
commercial environment and explicitly 
22 Above nl. 
23 Above nl, p4. 
24 Idem. 
notes that harmonisation does not mean 
replication of laws. 
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First, this is a mis-reading of paragraph 5 of the 
Memorandum. Paragraph 5 of the Memordandum says 
the goal of harmonisation and co-operation is 
achieving a mutually beneficial commercial 
environment and this includes the removal of any 
impediments to trade arising out of differences 
between the countries' business laws. Paragraph 2 
and 3 of the Memorandum are narrower in their aims. 
Paragraph 2 notes that differences can impede the 
creation of ''an environment conducive to the growth 
of trade in goods and services and the efficiency of 
both economies". Paragraph 3 notes the positive 
benefits. Paragraph 5, with its reference to a 
"mutually beneficial trans-Tasman commercial 
environment" appears to be referring to the benefits 
identified in paragraph 2 and 3. 
It appears that paragraph 5 uses something of a 
shorthand. Effectively the Report takes the goal of 
the entire Agreement and makes it the goal of the 
business law harmonisation process. 
Secondly, taken on its own, as an objective the 
"creation of a mutually beneficial commercial 
environment" is uncertain and elusive. What apart 
from the creation of a mutually beneficial 
commercial environment does it mean. It may not be 
meaningless but as the goal of a harmonisation 
programme is unhelpful. 
The identified objective is optimistic about the 
potency of law. This optimism is reflected in the 
leaders of the Steering Committee letter to the 
Australian Attorney-General and New Zealand Minister 
of Commerce which prefaces the Report. It says
25 
[a]s a tangible means by which trans-
Tasman trade can be significantly 
enhanced, harmonisation in fact has its 
roots in the original CER Treaty. It has 
been clearly identified as a major 'second 
generation' CER issue taking the broad 
historical and economic thrust of CER 
forward by drawing on the shared common 
law heritage of the two countries. 
11 
Laws ability to effect broad social change and 
facilitate economic development was attacked in the 
context of the 'law and development movement 1 •
26 
The movement was based on the promise that the 
development of Third World countries could be 
hastened by developing their law and legal 
institutions. 27 The movement was characterised by 
an instrumental view of law. 28 Laws, it was though, 
could be designed to achieve, and achieve social and 
economic change. The social consensus behind those 
purposes and the objective nature of law and legal 
institutions allowed law to achieve those purposes. 
Law was viewed as both as potent and important. The 
'law and development movement' underwent a crisis in 
the mid 1970s withered and died. It failed for many 
reasons not least of which was that the concept of 
law was wrong. 
[Scholars] have come to see that legal 
change may have little or no effect on 
social ~conomic conditions in the Third 
World. 2 
25 Letter from leaders of Committee to ministers 
which is forward to nl. 
26 See Synder "Law and Development In the Light of 
Dependency Theory'' 14 Law & Society Spring, 
1980, 723. 
27 D. Trubek and M. Gulanter "Scholars in Self-
Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis 
in law and Development Studies in the United 
States 4 Wisconsin Law Review 1974, 1062,1079. 
28 Ibid, 1973. 
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In the CER business law harmonisation context the 
insights gained in and by the demise of the 'law and 
development movement' are instructive. 
Harmonisation may not be able to achieve the 
objective the Steering Committee identify for it 
much less significantly enhance trans-Tasman trade, 
especially if there are already few legal 
impediments to trade. 30 Law can have a negative 
effect on trade if it places obstacles in the path 
of businesses trading as they would like. 
Harmonisation will have little effect on trade 
without businesses willing and able to take 
advantage of new opportunities created by it. In 
the CER context harmonisation of business law will 
create few opportunities as the legal differences at 
present create few impediments. Any positive impact 
on trade will be by facilitating and improving 
existing opportunities. 
The harmonisation process should have clear goals 
and should be based upon realistic expectations. 
The Memorandum in paragraph 2 identifies the 
negative effect that legal differences can have on 
the trading environment. Paragraph 3 states that 
the harmonisation of "significant areas" can 
advance the development of free trade and 
commerce between the two countries and 
facilitate the development of the 
efficiency and competitiveness of both 
countries in relation to international 
markets. 
These expectations are somewhat more limited than 
those identified by the Steering Committee Report. 
29 Ibid, 1080. 
30 Above nl, p5. 
In the Committee's examination of the meaning of 
harmonisation the Steering Committee noted that
31 
[w]hile the removal of impediments to 
trade caused by differences in the 
commercial laws of the two countries is 
obviously an important part of the 
harmonisation process, the Steering 
Committee notes that it is only one 
element of the process. Few of the 
business laws listed by the MOU create an 
impediment to trade in the strict sense of 
that term, ie. preventing or obstructing 
business between the two countries. 
Impediments of this kind usually take the 
form of tariffs and other border measures, 
most of which have already been eliminated 
pursuant to ANZCERTA. 
13 
The Committee then goes on to state that 
harmoni~~tion is really about lowering 'transaction 
costs'. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum states that 
harmonisation includes the removal of impediments. 
Harmonisation means something more than the mere 
removal of impediments. The precise meaning of 
harmonisation is difficult to determine from the 
Memorandum. There are indications that it is 
contemplated a reasonably limited concept. That it 
was left somewhat indefinite may reflect a desire 
not to artificially limit the subsequent 
examinations. 
31 Idem. 
32. Idem. 
33. Single European Act 1986 Article SA. 
34 Estein The Harmonisation of European Company 
Laws Bobbs-Merill Indianapolis 1973, p6. 
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HARMONISATION IN SOME OTHER SETTINGS 
The EEC harmonisation programme 
The European Community was always designed with the 
end goal of being one market. The Single European 
Act 1986, which further committee the European 
Community to being a single market, defines its 
internal market as "an area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensure in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty 11 • 33 
The Treaty's coverage of commercial and economic 
issues is comprehensive. Stein notes that34 
... the Treaty contemplates a coherent 
economic system which is to assure 
conditions essentially akin to a national 
integrated market. The system is in the 
nature of a market economy tempered by 
social welfare considerations, strong 
public control of agriculture and 
transportation and moderate public 
guidance of the economy. The guidance 
aims of the "magic triangle" of 
objectives: balanced growth, stability and 
higher living standards. 
To make this work the European Community (EC) relied 
on far greater intrusions into national laws than 
most international organisations. Gaudet 35 
separates the law making power of the European 
Community into three categories: 
35 Gaudet Incidences des Cornmunautes European 
sur le droit interne des Etats Members, 1963, 
Annales de la Faculte de Droit de Lieye, p5, 
quoted above n32. 
36 Above n34, plO. 
37 Above n34, pll. 
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(1) the removal of restrictions which impede 
members trading with other members 
(2) laws which put in place Community policy 
on matters such as agriculture and 
transportation. 
(3) "approximation" of laws of the Community 
Members "to the extent necessary for the 
functioning of the Common Market." 
The European Commission has the power to give 
directives to Members. This power extends to giving 
directives on specific matters where harmonisation 
is desired. Individuals can obtain declaratory 
judgments against governments for failure to comply 
adequately or within time limits with such 
directives. 36 
This degree of formality reflects on the sheer scope 
of the EC. The creation of institutions such as the 
European Commission, Parliament, Council and Court 
of Justice is necessary when trying to knit together 
twelve countries with divergent interests and rich 
histories of interaction into one economy. The 
application of the institutions to harmonisation of 
business law merely reflects on the overall 
thoroughness and purposefulness. 
The CER programme is in rather stark contrast. 
Apart from the Steering Committee the Memorandum 
provides that the Governments are to keep the other 
informed of reforms and for the Governments to 
consult when one considers that a law gives rise to 
an impediment to trade. This lessor degree of 
formality is appropriate considering the smaller 
scope of CER and the much greater possibility that 
problems may be amicably resolved. 
38 Above nlO, pll. 
3q Idem. 
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Differing terms are used in the European context of 
connote the reduction of differences between 
Community Members. Stein notes that there is no 
consistent usage of differing terms to indicate 
different concepts. 37 He concludes that there is no 
meaningful difference between the terms 
approximation, harmonisation and co-ordination:
38 
"they imply a process which conceivably led as far 
as the creation of a single uniform rule but may 
stop short of such a result. 1139 He also notes the 
importance of objective and institutions in 
harmonising the Community's law 
We concluded that approximation of 
laws in the first place has a very 
special function in the Treaty 
scheme, that is to bring about 
adjustment in national laws when they 
impede the coalescence process. This 
function not only controls the 
direction of the effort but also 
supplies it with motive force. 
Second the new institutions provide 
an "organised impulse" as well as a 
measure of enforcement and uniform 
interpretation. 
Harmonisation is merely a means to an end; with the 
end being the social and political aims of the 
Community. It has been said in the EEC context 
that40 
The aim of harmonisation however, is not 
merely the imposition of similar or 
identical rules on a purely technical 
level, but the harmonisation of national 
policies behind the rules, and the 
development of a policy common to all the 
Member States. In order for harmonisation 
~- Caroline Bradley "Harmonised Takeover and 
Merger Regulations Within the EEC" 7 Company 
Lawyer, 1986, 131,134. 
4~ Case 41/74 [1974] ECR 1337. 
to be effective the Member States must 
lose their right to reform the rules 
independently: harmonisation involves an 
irrevocable surrender of legislative 
competence to the Community institutions. 
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Part of this surrender of legislative competence was 
accomplished by the doctrine of direct effect, which 
has already been briefly mentioned. In the Von 
Duyn41 case in 1974 the European Court of Justice 
held that Commission directives can be relied on 
before national courts even though they have not 
been incorporated into legislation. the argument 
which carried the day was the policy that the 
effectiveness of directives would be greatly 
increased if they could be relied on before national 
courts. 42 Hartley in The Foundations of European 
Community Law notes that43 
[t]he fact of the matter is that Member 
States are often very remiss in 
implementing directives. The Netherlands 
is generally regarded as one of the most 
conscientious of the Member States, yet a 
study by two Dutch authors has shown that 
even the Dutch have a bad record in this 
regard: of the 94 directives chosen for 
examination, almost two-thirds were not 
implemented on time. If this is the state 
of affairs in The Netherlands, one can 
expect that things will be even worse in 
some other countries. 
Direct effect emphasises the comprehensiveness of 
the European approach. This approach has, as Stein 
points out, 44 the virtue of being 'wholistic'. It 
TC Hartley The Foundations of European 
Community Law (2 ed) Clarendon Press: Oxford 
1988, pp 201-204. 
Above n41. 
Above n34, p14. 
Europe 1992 : The Facts Publication prepared by 
the British Department of Trade and Industry 
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involves harmonisation simultaneously of national 
policy and technical rules. The importance of 
policy co-ordination in the commercial area, has as 
will be shown, been emphatically demonstrated 
recently in New Zealand. 
It is interesting that despite dealing with twelve 
countries and with civil and common law, only eight 
directives have been adopted in the field of company 
law. 45 These deal with areas of obvious importance 
such as accounting standards, mergers and takeovers 
and capitalisation requirements. The aim is to 
minimise difficulties for businesses operating in 
more than one Member. There are five other 
directives which have yet to be adopted and there is 
a proposal for a European Company Statute. This is 
a proposed complete new set of company law. If 
adopted it will be an alternative to existing 
national laws and will be available to new companies 
formed by the merger of companies from two or more 
Member States. 4 6/, 
The European approach has been called 'positive' 
integration. 47 It has the strengths of being 
realistic and pragmatic. It recognises that 
differences are inevitable and rather than trying to 
eliminate them all, only those which present an 
obstacle to the goal of the EEC are dealt with. The 
and the Central Office of Information 1989, 
p21. 
4~ Ibid, 22. 
46b Idem. 
47 Sir Frank Holmes et al Closer Economic 
Relations with Australia: Agenda for Progress, 
Victoria University Press on behalf of the 
Institute of Policy studies, p81. 
48 Sealy "A Company Law for Tomorrow's World" 7 
Company Laywer, 1981, 195,200. 
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approach taken then appears to be to try and provide 
common ground. A roaring analogy may be made. 
Europe's laws are a maze which an unwary interloper 
travels at their peril. Rather than smooth and 
straighten everything, the most serious problems are 
dealt with and where possible alternate routes are 
provided. 
As has been noted, the implementation of Commission 
policy and directives is another matter. It has 
been said that in relation to United Kingdom company 
law that when implementing harmonisation policies 
generally the wrong option has been taken48 
What we needed to do thoroughly we have 
done by halves - for instance the 
abolition of ultra vires, for which there 
was good precedent throughout the 
Commonwealth. Where little more than a 
cosmetic touch would have met the case, we 
have gone overboard with pages and pages 
of complicated rules and sanctions. 
Which neatly illustrates the problems and 
difficulties posed by harmonisation. 
Harmonisation in some Federal Jurisdiction 
Harmonisation has arisen in many countries. In 
Canada, Australia and the United States 
harmonisation issues have arisen in the context of 
different laws amongst the states or provinces. 
Though the issues are not identical to the ones 
posed by CER, their experiences are instructive. 
In Canada the provinces, with the exception of 
Quebec, started from a similar common law base and 
49 R.C.C. Cumming (ed) Harmonisation of Business 
Law in Canada 1986, University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, pl70. 
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drifted apart. The question of harmonising the law 
soon arose. Ronald Cumming identified the problem 
which harmonisation addresses as being raised 
transaction costs. 49 
A financier carrying on business in 
several jurisdictions in Canada is 
required to comply with the applicable 
personal property security law of each 
jurisdiction. Lack of substantial harmony 
among the laws of the jurisdictions in 
which he carries on business will 
inevitably increase his costs. At best, 
he will be required to obtain legal advice 
concerning the laws of each jurisdiction, 
prepare separate procedures for use in 
each of those jurisdictions. The need to 
do this may be of no great significance 
with respect to jurisdictions that offer a 
large potential market for the financier. 
However, the extra cost involved in 
compliance with the law of a jurisdiction 
that offers only a small market may at 
worst discourage entry into that market. 
This is the concern motivating advocates of a high 
degree of harmonisation with Australia. 
Hurlburt50 calls this argument the business 
efficiency argument. 51 
Many businesses transcend provincial boundaries. 
Business is made less efficient if it has to conform 
to differing provincial laws and regulatory 
requirements. This is the argument for 
harmonisation which is most frequently made. It is 
most strongly made in connection with such fields as 
50 W H Hurlburt "Harmonisation of Provincial 
Legislation in Canada: The Elusive Goal" 12 
Con Bus Law Journal 1986-87, 387,393 (this 
paper forms part of a symposium bearing the 
same name) . 
51 Idem. 
52 Idem. 
securities regulation, corporation law, personal 
property security law, and insurance law. 
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He then notes that while the insurance industry 
lobbies for uniform laws, the business community is 
generally apathetic towards reforms aimed at uniform 
law and do not lobby. His conclusion on the merits 
of the argument is that52 
If the business efficiency argument is 
important, it is surprising that business 
does not make it more frequently and more 
vigorously. Certainly, business spends 
much time lobbying for what it wants, but 
there does not appear to be evidence that 
in general if mounts vigorous and 
sustained lobbying efforts to achieve 
uniformity or harmonisation of laws. The 
lack of such evidence may be a reason for 
a careful examination of the argument 
wherever it is made, but emperical 
evidence for the costs caused by 
inharmonious laws is often available and 
the argument should not be overbooked. 
Other reasons for advocating harmony are53 
(a) non-business interests in areas such 
as matrimonial property and the law 
of succession 
(b) differences without rational 
foundation may well bring the law 
into disrepute 
(c) harmony assists the development of 
the law by focusing all the 
jurisprudential effort expended 
(d) it strengthens the social and 
cult~ral t!!s between the 
provinces. 
Harmonisation is difficult to define. 55 
53 Above n :1) , p393-4. 
54 See also n49, p4 J Ziegel. 
55 Above n50, 389. 
Harmony is in the intellectual eye of the 
beholder. One legal philosopher's harmony 
may be another's dissonance. A lawyer may 
perceive doctrinal harmony where a 
businessman perceives administrative 
anarchy. 
Ziegel argues for substantial uniformity "in 
areas deemed important for the fluent conduct 
of trade or cornmerce1156 - though he argues that 
social and cultural reasons 'may be' as 
important as economic efficiency. He 
acknowledges that "(t]here are surprisingly 
little hard data about the costs of provincial 
diversity'' and that " ... many of the victims of 
non-uniform laws are surprisingly passive about 
their fate. 1157 
The Uniform Law Conference of Canada has been 
central to the debate in Canada. It selects 
its topics by a fairly informa1 58 means and has 
displayed impressive industriousness in 
developing and adopting 67 Acts. 59 Its 
effectiveness is another matter. Of the 56 
Acts which are still current, only one has been 
accepted by all twelve provinces. By far, the 
majority have been adopted in half or fewer of 
the provinces. 60 Included in those figures are 
Acts which have been accepted in part or have 
been modified. 
The failure of the Canadian Uniform Law 
Conference is attributable to a 'lack of will' 
56 Above n49, 6. 
57 Idem. 
58 Ibid, 13. 
59 Ibid, 14. 
60 Ibid, 20. 
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both generally and on the part of those active 
in the Conference. 61 Hurlburt argues that62 
[t]wo things are required. The first 
is the will to pursue harmonisation. 
The second is machinery to implement 
the will. 
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The existence of will is the fundamental condition. 
If it exists, harmonisation will be pursued. If it 
does not exist, creating and maintaining 
harmonisation machinery is futile. 
Close criticises the Uniform Law Conference for the 
informality with which it selects its project63 
... the Conference should become much more 
selective in those topics it chooses to 
pursue as suitable for uniform 
legislation. At one time a number of very 
stringent tests had to be met before a 
particular topic was thought suitable for 
action by the Uniform Law Conference. 
Over the past 10 to 20 years the only 
criteria seems to have been that someone 
in some jurisdiction thought it would be a 
good idea and was prepared to work on it. 
the reputation of the Conference suffers 
badly when it wanders into areas where 
uniformity is of minor importance and 
where there is no "demand" for it. 
In the CER context the Memorgndum directs attention 
towards 'significant areas'. 4 The harmonisation 
process will be ongoing and could be trivialised by 
'wandering into areas of minor importance' and 
eroding political enthusiasm towards the process. 
61 Ibid, 17. 
62 Above n50, 416. 
63 A Close "Harmonisation of Provincial 
Legislation in Canada" 12 Can Bus Law Journal 
1986-87, 425,428. 
64 Paragraph 3. 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY ~ F WELUNGTON 
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In Canada over time the push for uniform legislation 
changed from one for codification of existing laws 
to a recognition that uniform law was an exercise in 
law reform. 65 Compromises between divergent 
provincial legislation will often be unsatisfactory 
and therefore the uniformity they offer is 
shortlived. Speaking of the work of provincial law 
reform commissions Close said66 
[r]arely will a law reform commission 
replace harmony with discord without a 
corresponding gain in the form of an 
improved law. A loss of uniformity where 
the uniform law was bad or unworkable 
should not be mourned too loud or too 
long. 
AUSTRALIA 
In Australia there have been movements to harmonise 
state laws which have drifted apart over time. The 
Australian situation is in some ways worse than the 
Canadian. The Federal Government is comparatively 
weaker and the states are fiercely independent. 
There have been some moves toward reducing the 
differences between state laws since 1945. 67 The 
Uniform Companies Act 1964 and the Corporations Act 
1989 are some of the successes. In Australia the 
role of the Standing Committee of Commonwealth and 
State Attorneys-General. This is a somewhat 
informal body which has the strength of involving 
personnel who are close to the decision making 
processes. This strength is perhaps outweighed by 
the requirement that all decisions reached must be 
unanimous. The main problem is a lack of desire on 
the part of the participants in the absence of clear 
65 Above n50, 408. 
66 Above n50, 430. 
67 Above n41, 40 J Ziegel. 
incentives. This lack of desire is well shown by 
Michael Hodgman who in discussion following the 
presentation of a paper entitled "The Work of the 
Standing Committee of Attorneys-Genera1 1168 by the 
Attorney-General N H Brown said69 
I am suspicious of this phrase "co-
operative federalism" which is referred to 
so frequently in the paper which you have 
presented. Sir, I am not sure that 
uniformity is, in fact, the answer. If 
uniformity is the be-all and end-all, and 
it seems to me that co-operative 
federalism in the context of this paper 
seems to boil down to uniformity, it makes 
one wonder what is the point of having the 
States. We could not have wonderful 
social experimentation into such happy 
subjects, although I don't think there is 
any connection between daylight saving and 
abortion, but both South Australia and 
Tasmania have experimented, if that is the 
correct phrase, in both fields, and surely 
the founding father did at least 
anticipate that by the retention of the 
States as separate entities, it wasn't 
going to be a matter of course that 
uniformity was going to be foisted upon 
us. 
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Australia's and Canada's experiences illustrate the 
difficulty of obtaining harmony in the absence of 
the political will and incentives. 
The United States 
The United States is different from the Australian 
and Canadian situations as"··· no one seriously 
argues any more that federal legislation cannot deal 
with every facet of human activity 11 •
7° Federal 
68 1971 45 ALJ 489. 
69 1971 45 ALJ 489,499. 
70 M Shanker "The American Experience on 
Harmonisation (Uniformity) of State Laws. 12 
Can Bus Journal 1986-87, 433,438. 
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statutes which overrule state legislation have been 
a force for uniformity in many areas. Nevertheless 
many areas central to commerce have been left to 
state legislation. In company law for instance, 
there is a market for company law with each state 
having its own legislation and companies choosing 
where to incorporate. 71 
The most distinctive feature of the United States 
situation is the National Conference of Commissions 
on Uniform State Laws. The National Conference has 
a full time staff and a duty to lobby for the 
enactment of its proposals. 72 It enjoys a good 
reputation but its record of success is not 
appreciably better than the Canadian Uniform Law 
Conference. Over half the Acts passed by the 
National Conference have been accepted in fewer than 
a quarter of the 53 jurisdictions. 73 
The crowning achievement of the National Conference 
is the Uniform Commercial Code. Advanced by the 
Conference in 1951 in conjunction with the American 
Law Institute it has been accepted in all of the 
states with the exception of Louisiana (where it has 
been partially adopted) and in the District of 
Columbia. Ziegel notes that74 
The near-universal adoption of the Uniform 
Commercial Code is indeed a magnificent 
achievement, but the success of this great 
enterprise is the result of special 
factors, and the enormous efforts made to 
secure its acceptance by the states. 
71 See "Federation and Corporate law: Reflections 
Upon Delaware" 83 Yale LJ 663(1974). 
72 Above nSO, 434. 
73 Ibid, 436. 
74 Above n49, 39. 
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Magnificent achievement it may be; nevertheless, it 
is not an unqualified success" the UCC is not 
"uniform" and, no doubt never will be. 1175 This 
virtual uniformity has its costs. 76 
(i]t •.. serves as a first-rate trap for 
the practitioner from another state who 
thinks he can rely on the official version 
of the Uniform Act which seemingly is in 
force in the other state. I could give 
many personal examples where some minor 
variation in a Uniform Act brought about 
by local legislation or local judicial 
interpretation tripped up the unsuspecting 
out-of-state businessman or lawyer. As a 
result, even when a Uniform Act has been 
enacted in a particular state, the out-of-
state must check the precise statute 
actually enacted in that state and its 
local judicial interpretations. 
Transaction costs, it appears, will always be with 
us. The achievement of the ucc is that77 
[d]espite some degrees of non uniformity, 
at least most of the country speaks the 
same basic language and deals with the 
same basic concepts in broad areas of 
commercial law. This result, even if 
flawed, is remarkable. 
75 c W Mooney "Introduction to the Uniform 
Commerical Code Annual survey: Some 
Observations on the Past, Present and Future of 
the U. c. c. " 41 Bus L 13 4 3, 13 4 6 ( 19 8 6) . 
76 Above n50, 436. 
77 Above n75, 1360. 
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DISCUSSION IN NEW ZEALAND 
There has been discussion of CER and harmonisation 
in New Zealand. Apart from the Steering Committee's 
Report, other recent work in the area includes John 
Farrar's address to the Australasian Universities 
Law Schools Association "Harmonisation of Business 
Law between New Zealand and Australia1178 and the 
Ministry of Commerce's Paper Impediments to Trans-
Tasman Trade: Harmonisation of Business Law. 79 
These both provide an overview of the laws which may 
be relevant to the harmonisation question and brief 
examinations of the concept itself. There have been 
a a number of statements made concerning the concept 
itself. An examination of these is useful. they 
show, if nothing else, the sheer ambiguity of the 
concept. 
In terms of the distinction between harmonisation 
and replication Sir Owen Woodhouse had this to say 
at the Australasian Law Reform Conference in 1988. 80 
Clearly the removal of regulatory 
impediments to trade is not the sole 
purpose of harmonisation. The 
contemporary, decisive approach to the 
closer economic relationship requires at 
least the provision of a congenial legal 
environment - one which can give 
confidence to those affected by it because 
it is stable, comprehensible and 
consistent on both sides of the Tasmania. 
The Memorandum of Understanding states the 
effective harmonisation does not require 
replication of laws, although that may be 
appropriate in some cases. I understand 
that rather strange word 'replication' is 
78 19 VUWLR (1989) 435. 
79 Impediments to Trans-Tasman Trade: 
Harmonisation of Business Law Ministry of 
Commerce, Wellington 1989. 
80 Above nl4. 
used in the sense of precise 
identification, and in that sense, I 
support the proviso is sensible enough, 
but I would think problems will arise 
unless those embarked upon various aspects 
of the general exercise act on the 
sensible principle that the more it is 
possible to move from approximation of 
laws in the direction of actual 
uniformity, then the more helpful will be 
the end result. Sometimes for that reason 
the Australian model ought to be the 
general answer. One the other hand, 
sometimes the New Zealand recommendation 
will be more appropriate. In that regard 
I am able t say in this admirably candid 
Canberra climate that when one player is 
considerably larger, the smaller must 
always be politely audible. 
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Sir Owen advocates a high degree of uniformity. One 
might crisis that view by noting that actual 
uniformity will be virtually impossible to achieve 
and that all solutions will be compromises. Short 
of uniformity all responses will be 'half-way' 
measures. 
John Collinge, the former Chairman of the Commerce 
Commission in his address at the 1987 Law Society 
Conference said81 
[t)o put the Treaty in perspective, it 
must be seen as part only, but a 
consistent part, of New Zealand's macro-
economic policy, its trade policy and its 
other international obligations. It must 
also be seen in the context of New 
Zealand's own legislation because the 
Treaty does not deprive the Member States 
to reform independently. Likewise there 
may be circumstances in which other 
international obligations must also be 
considered. Harmonisation of laws is not 
an end in itself but it is rather a means 
of assisting the economic aims of the 
Treaty. To harmonise, it is necessary to 
compare the different national rules and 
to find a solution to any significant 
differences geared to the free trade 
objective of the Treaty. 
81 New Zealand Law Conference Papers 1987, p61. 
On the question of harmonisation he said 
Immediately there is the question of the 
definition of "harmonisation". Obviously 
it means bring laws into harmony but how 
is that to be achieved? First, it can 
mean working towards rules which are 
either identical or, at least, uniform in 
the sense that say minimum or maximum 
standards are required to be observed. On 
the other hand, it can mean working 
towards laws which are complementary with 
each other in that they are each 
compatible with the Treaty objective of 
free trade. the first definition can be 
discarded as an exclusive interpretation 
because it would restrict flexibility of 
action and fail to allow for differences 
between the two countries. However, in 
relation to say standards of labelling it 
may be pointless to have rules which are 
merely compatible since carrying on 
business throughout Australasia would 
simply mean adopting the highest standard. 
There may therefore be cases when 
harmonisation requires that there be a 
uniformity of rules as well as those cases 
in which compatibility is sufficient. 
There are, however, two ancillary meanings 
which, though they are not necessarily the 
preferred meanings, may be gladly seized 
upon when there is a dispute as to what 
constitutes harmonisation. the first is 
the working towards a reduction in 
differences of laws generally, ie 
minimising the likelihood of distortions 
but not necessarily eliminating trade 
distortion features. The second is the 
formal recognition of each others laws so 
matters valid in Australia would be 
recognised in New Zealand, and vice versa. 
This interpretation amounts, in effect, to 
each recognizing the right of the other to 
do as it wishes in any particular area of 
law. Accordingly the word "harmonisation" 
appears to have been deftly chosen by the 
draftsman of the Treaty to cover such 
meaning as may be found most appropriate 
in each case. It means what governments 
like it to mean. The practical effect of 
this assessment is to leave significant 
discretions (in relation to enacting laws) 
and to the courts (in interpreting the 
same) as to what harmonisation requires in 
any particular case. Certainly, 
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harmonisation does not mean the necessary 
adoption of identical policies but rather 
the commitment to make free trade work. 
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This appears to say that harmonisation is so deft as 
to be meaningless and that this is a good thing. 
This was written before the 1988 Memorandum. the 
context of the debate has shifted away from 
harmonisation in the raw. The Memorandum allows the 
first definition given to the discorded as the 
general meaning and restricts the Members' 'right 
... to do as it wishes'. This leaves the notions of 
compatibility and working towards a reduced 
differences generally. the focus shifts to what 
this means in the context of the Memorandum and the 
Australia New Zealand legal context. 
The report of the Proceedings of the Workshop on 
Harmonisation of Business Laws at the Joint 
Conference of the Australia and New Zealand Business 
Councils contained the following resolutions82 
( i) 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
That the ANZBC recognise and 
emphasis to the two governments 
that: 
harmonisation of business laws 
does not require replication; 
harmonisation is not an end in 
itself but is rather a means of 
reducing or eliminating 
identified impediments to trans-
Tasman trade and investment; 
the harmonisation process itself 
should not act as an impediment 
to continuing law reform in 
either country but the anzbc 
endorses the need for such 
reform to occur on the basis of 
consultation between the two 
countries. 
82 Held in Wellington 3 and 4 November 1988. 
Source above n78, p447. 
(ii) That the ANZBC recommend to the 
two governments that the 
harmonisation of Business Laws 
be proceeded with as rapidly as 
possible in those areas which 
are of a technical/procedural 
nature, or otherwise not in 
dispute. In areas of 
substantive and fundamental 
content (such as those specified 
in paragraphs S(a) and S(b) of 
the Memorandum of Understanding 
on the Harmonisation of Business 
Law) compatibility of laws 
should be worked toward in an 
orderly manner, with a view to 
achieving the best regimes for 
both countries. 
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The ANZBC approach is notable for its moderate 
approach. Its resolutions certainly do not amount 
to a strident lobby for rapid harmonisation. They 
emphasise the role of harmonisation - a means to an 
end - and the need for the harmonisation process to 
be orderly resulting in the best regimes in each 
country. It's an extremely pragmatic approach. The 
absence of any real concern about transaction costs 
from a body such as the ANZBC calls into question 
arguments for law reform made on the basis of them. 
In a similar vein, Professor Farrar in his AULSA 
address said83 
Harmonisation is a very ambiguous concept 
which describes a political and a legal 
process ... Harmonisation is simply a 
means to an end. In the case of CER the 
end is the establishment of a free trade 
area. Steps must be taken to eliminate 
obstacles to the establishment of this. 
Sir Frank Holmes, the leading proponent of free 
trade with Australia in Closer Economic Relations 
with Australia: Agenda for Progress said84 
83 Above n78, 435,445. 
84 Above n46, p81. 
In general we consider that uniformity of 
laws is in most cases not necessary for 
the satisfactory operation of the 
Agreement. Approximation of laws can be 
useful and New Zealand continue to be 
influenced by Australian law and practice 
but it is not necessary for the smooth 
running of a free trade agreement. 
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This is the most minimal approach to harmonisation. 
It suggests that to eliminate barriers to free 
trade, very little need be done. On this point, it 
is consistent with the Steering Committee Report -
though the Rep~rt uses the transaction-costs 
argument to suggest a bigger role for harmonisation. 
The most critical view of harmonisation is from Ian 
Douglas who said85 
[y)ou have asked me to speak on 
'Harmonisation', a word that was widely 
used in the lengthy discussions that 
preceded the formal negotiation of the 
closer economic relationship with 
Australia. It is like 'consensus', one of 
those warm friendly words that appeal to 
politicians, but in this context at least 
its easy amiability cloaks dangerous 
fallacies and ambivalent motives. 
Harmonisation is a dangerous concept for 
three reasons. First, arrangements based 
on it will almost inevitably be sub-
optimal compromises. Secondly, 
harmonisation would limit options whereas 
the expansion of objectives is an 
important implicit objective of CER. 
Thirdly, the concept of harmonisation 
focuses thinking on the wrong issues and 
in so doing it detracts from the 
philosophical integrity of the Agreement. 
85 Seminar on CER - An Agenda for Progress 
Institute of Policy Studies Wellington. Ian 
Douglas "Harmonisation of Bounties, 
Tarrifs,etc. 
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The sub-optional compromises may be similar to the 
half-way consensus non-solutions referred to by Sir 
Owen. 
The Law Commission has dealt with harmonisation 
several times. The Law Commission Report No. 8 A 
Personal Property Securities Act for New Zealand 
noted that there was no evidence that the 
significant differences in personal security law 
between Australia and New Zealand were causing 
difficulties. The adoption of the PPSA by New 
Zealand would cause no new problems. 86 The report 
notes the considerable problems with Australia's law 
and mentions some were in favour of harmonising with 
Australia simply to achieve harmony. 87 The report 
states88 
The Committee is of the view that a more 
measured approach to harmonisation issues 
is necessary, a view which is supported by 
the July 1988 Memorandum of Understanding 
between Australia and New Zealand on the 
harmonisation of business law and by the 
subsequent official press releases. 
This measured approach was spelt out in the 
Commission's 1989 Annual Report 
This states89 
Report No. 10. 
86 
87 
88 
89 
The Memorandum of Understanding entered 
into between Australia and New Zealand in 
June 1988 as part of the revised CER 
arrangements is likely to have an 
important although as yet uncertain effect 
Law Commission Report No. 8 : A Personal 
Property Securities Act for New Zealand April 
1989, pl77. 
Ibid, pl78. 
Idem. 
Law Commission 1989 Annual Report Report No. 
10, p5. 
on the development of commercial law in 
its widest sense. 
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The Memorandum looked towards the harmonisation of 
business law and regulatory practices. It set up a 
programme to examine a number of areas, with the 
object of identifying those in which harmonisation 
will help to achieve a mutually beneficial trans-
Tasman commercial environment. Particular attention 
is to be paid to areas where different laws impede 
trade between Australia and New Zealand. 
The goal is clear, but the manner of its achievement 
is not yet so certain. Harmonisation is a word of 
imprecise meaning. In a statement of the time, the 
New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister referred to 
''compatible" laws and added that it would not be a 
matter of one country following or copying the other 
laws. Nevertheless there will inevitably be a 
drawing together of laws - they will be designed at 
least to fit with each other. And in some cases 
uniform law will be the sensible answer. The 
Memorandum itself states that effective 
harmonisation ''does not require replication of laws 
although that may be appropriate in some cases. 
What is important is that common legislation should 
not crystalise around an existing inadequate or 
unsatisfactory law. Reform should not be frozen by 
the supposed goal of uniformity. On various topics 
either Australia or New Zealand might take the lead 
- one adopting or adopting more advanced legislation 
enacted in the other. Sometimes the two countries 
should co-operate in devising a new answer. 
Conversely, there will be a need to avoid 
legislation that is merely the mean point of two 
presently separate pieces of law. Compromise 
solutions are often no solutions at all. 
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Harmonisation has attracted a reasonable amount of 
interest and a wide range of opinions have been 
expressed. Most would agree with the statements 
that "harmonisation is a means to an end" and 
"harmonisation does not require replication". Where 
differences would emerge would be on the question of 
transaction costs. Those who view them as important 
may allow harmonisation to become a rather more 
intrusive concept - for instance, in delaying law 
reform. The concept underlying transaction costs is 
"the creation of a mutually beneficial commercial 
environment" and the role of law in this. 
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HARMONISATION - SOME PROBLEMS 
The Steering Committee Report takes a 'liberal' view 
of the harmonisation question. It lacks clear 
objectives. The vagueness of the identified 
objective - "the creation of a mutually beneficial 
environment" results in an emphasis on investment 
related concern. Consider the following phrases: 
"share capital requirements have an important effect 
on the operation of the trans-Tasman investment 
environment. Harmonisation laws will facilitate the 
development of a common fundraising environment1190 , 
"the development of harmonised requirements for 
corporate fundraising will assist in the creation of 
a more efficient trans-Tasman capital raising 
environment1191 . Elsewhere the Report refers to a 
difference in laws being unlikely to have a 
"disharmonising effect on trans-Tasman business. 1192 
These considerations - harmonised business 
environment and a common fundraising environment -
are not concerns in free trade agreement; though 
they fit with seeking a closer economic relationship 
generally. The EEC which is committed to a closer 
economic relationship than CER only aims at free 
movement of capital and not a "common fundraising 
environment." As noted earlier, CER has not 
achieved free capital movement. 93 As for a 
harmonised business environment, the importance of 
policy should not be overlooked. Business law can 
hinder the environment but cannot create :~ 
90 Above nl, p20, para 7.37. 
91 Ibid, p25, para 7.57. 
92 Ibid, p20, para 7.36. 
93 See text accompanying notes 17-20. 
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The ANZ/National Mutual merger provides an example 
of this. the merger was announced on 2 April 199094 
and was to create a financial giant of some 110 
billion dollar. 95 Given the genuinely trans-Tasman 
nature of the enterprises it would provide a good 
test of the degree of harmonisation. 
In New Zealand all mergers over a certain threshold 
have to seek Commerce Commission approval lest they 
establish dominance in a market. Despite the size 
of the concerns approval was little more than a 
formality. After the proposal was received the 
investigative machinery of the Commission swung into 
action. On 1 May the investigation was completed 
and a report made to the Commerce Commission. the 
one and a half page report concluded that96 
ANZ and National Mutual are both 
significant financial institutions in 
their own right. However, their 
activities principally relate to different 
markets and the merger will not result in 
the creation of dominance in any market. 
In Australia the Trade Practices Commission operates 
differently. Merger participants proceed with their 
plans but the Authority can challenge them in court. 
A practice of approaching the Trade Practices 
Commission for an informal approval has developed 
which is effectively similar to the New Zealand 
mechanism but lacks any legal status. 97 No approach 
to the Commission was made by the participants98 , 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
The Australian April 3, pl. 
The Australian April 2, pl7. 
Report from David Scobie and Dick Adam of 
Commerce Commission on ANZ/NML merger dated 
1/5/90. 
Above n79, p21. 
The Australian May 25, pl5. 
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however the merger did not result in sufficient 
concentration for it to be challenged. 99 
Nevertheless the Chairman of the Commission, 
Professor Bob Baxt, had the Australian Treasury 
warned about the proposa1. 100 He was not concerned 
about the market concentration resulting from the 
merger but feared that it could set a precedent 
leading to increased market concentration. 101 
The regulatory bodies which had an interest in the 
merger were the Reserve Bank, the Federal Treasury 
and the Superannuation and Insurance Commission. As 
the market concentration was in theory insufficient 
for the Trade Practices Authority, there was no 
authority reviewing the market power question. The 
merger was in part motivated by the Federal 
Government's opposition to mergers between 
Australia's large banks. 102 Ironically for similar 
reasons on 24 May Paul Keating, the Treasurer, 
vetoed the merger. He was quoted in The Australian 
as saying the merger would lead to103 
(u)ndue concentration of economic power 
It is vital for the efficient 
application of the nation's savings that 
there should be a reasonable diversity of 
institutions and effective competition in 
the banking, life insurance and more 
generally in the provision of financial 
services ... It is equally important that 
the community should have confidence that 
its savings are in secure hands. 
99 Idem. Professor Bob Baxt is quoted as saying 
the proposal did not involve "market dominance" 
problems. 
100 Idem. 
101 Idem. 
102 The Australian April 3, pl7. 
103 The Australian May 24, pl. 
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One commentator noted the decision to veto reflected 
a concern that this merger would inevitably result 
in others and that before long there would be too 
dominant financial institutions in Australia. This 
process "is likely to detract from effective and 
vigorous competition than is in the national 
interest. 11104 
A New Zealand official expressed privately what may 
be a more likely explanation. His opinion was that 
the Treasurer was really concerned about the 
influence of large institutions on the money 
supply. 105 Certainly the references to the (u]ndue 
concentration of economic power" can be interpreted 
consistently with this theory. 
Either the merger was vetoed for Australia and 
effectively for New Zealand. The failure of the 
merger shows up a disharmony. What sort of 
disharmony is another question. Legally it appears 
the Treasurer had no power to veto the merger. 
Section 65 of the Banking Act 1959 does provide that 
a bank shall not without the prior written consent 
of the Treasurer 
(a) enter into an arrangement for any sale or 
disposal of its business by amalgamation 
or otherwise, or for carrying on of 
business in partnership with another bank; 
or 
(b) effect a reconstruction of the bank. 
The transaction though dubbed a merger was in form 
and in substance a takeover of a reconstituted 
National Mutual by the ANZ. Though section 65 is a 
104 Idem. 
105 Who in the best tradition of unnamed officials 
declined to be quoted. 
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legal discontinuity it was irrelevant to the 
'business disharmony'. Despite the lack of legal 
authority the participants decided that compliance 
with the directive was the most sensible path. Will 
Bailey, ANZ's Chief Executive said106 
You can't fight the Government of the day, 
well we can ... but if the Government of 
the day is committed to the process we 
would only lose money and the QCs would be 
the winners. 
For whatever reasons the Australian Government had 
blocked the merger. The relevant regulatory 
authorities had approved it with conditions. 107 The 
Trade Practices Commission were concerned but not by 
the market concentration levels involved in the 
merger. 
At the official opening of the National Mutual New 
Zealand head office the then Prime Minister, 
Geoffrey Palmer, referred to the merger. The front 
page report in the Dominion reads108 
The scuttling this week of the proposed 
merger between insurance group National 
Mutual and ANZ Bank highlighted the need 
for the harmonisation of laws between 
Australia and New Zealand, Mr Palmer said 
at the opening of National Mutual's new 
head office yesterday. 
"The announcement by the Australian 
Treasurer highlights major differences in 
the regulatory environment between New 
Zealand and Australia. 
We are going to have to sort these things 
out because we don't want them to become 
obstacles to business," he said ... 
106 The Australian May 25, pl3. 
107 The Australian May 24, pl. 
108 Dominion May 26, pl. 
Mr Palmer said it was important to have 
similar rules on both sides of the Tasman 
to avoid discontinuity of the type that 
had scuttled the merger. 
"Obviously it will take time to get that 
harmony, and harmony doesn't mean that 
it's always the same, but nevertheless 
there needs to be broad comparability." 
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The comments, if accurately reported, ignore that 
essentially the same result was achieved by the 
regulatory authorities on both sides of the 
Tasmania. The Trade Practices Commission showed 
itself willing to get involved despite the lack of a 
legislative mandate. 
The 'discontinuity' was a reflection of the 
discontinuity in the Government's policies. Given 
the sort of action the Treasurer was willing to 
take, it is hard to see how any degree of legal 
harmonisation would change things. Paul Keating did 
not like it, it did not happen and all the similar 
rules in the world would not change it. 
The failure of the merger illustrates the importance 
of governmental policy in the creation of that 
utopia which is "a mutually beneficial commercial 
environment". It also illustrates the relative 
unimportance of law in that endeavour: despite the 
regulatory environment achieving similar results the 
merger failed. If anything the merger shows harmony 
in the regulatory/legal framework; further 
harmonisation would have been equally redundant as 
the present level. 
Constitutional Differences 
The steering Committee fails to identify and deal 
with differences in the systems of Government. New 
Zealand with its unicameral legislature has the 
ability to pass legislation with "almost indecent 
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speed. 11109 We have the "fastest law in the 
west 11 • 110 Australia in contrast has bicameral 
legislatives in every state except Queensland and a 
bicameral Federal Parliament. the fierce 
independence of the states also needs to be taken 
into account. 
Harmonisation is easier to achieve by changing New 
Zealand law than through mutual change or changing 
the Australia law. The Steering Committee Report 
perhaps bears this concern out in the matters 
subject to specific follow up action. 111 No 
Australian law reform imitative is held up or will 
be directly monitored. The important reform of 
insolvency law is dealt with by monitoring the 
consultations between officials from both countries 
in the development of the legislation. 112 New 
Zealand's law, on the other hand, is subject to a 
fair amount of scrutiny and in respect of the Law 
Commissions Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) 
the proposal is that it is deferred until Australia 
have completed their reform exercise. 113 This 
delaying of New Zealand's law reform goes well 
beyond what is required by Article 9 of the 
Memorandum - that the governments are to keep each 
other informed and consult on proposed business law. 
Perhaps the greater emphasis on New Zealand law 
reflects that the New Zealand members of the 
Committee came to the table with more enthusiasm. 
109 Jack Hodder's phrase in The Capital Letter TCL 
13/24 3/7/90, pl. 
110 GWR Palmer Unbridled Power (2 ed), Auckland OUP 
1987, pl38. 
111 See Appendix A. 
112 Above nl, p73. 
113 Above nl, p72. 
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there appears to be something of a lack of 
excitement about harmonisation in Australia. 114 
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New Zealands ability to pass legislation quickly can 
be a disharmonising influence as well. The 
Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 
was legislation which was rapidly implemented to 
deal with some of the potentially disastrous 
corporate failures in the wake of the 1987 share 
market crash. It gives a wide range of powers to 
the Securities Commission and the Registrar of 
Companies to investigate and place companies in 
statutory management. 115 The powers given to 
statutory managers include powers to suspend 
payments of debts or the discharge of obligations 
and a wide ranging moratorium on the exercise of 
rights against the corporation for the duration of 
the statutory management. 116 
The Steering Committee Report does not refer to the 
Companies (Investigation and Management) Act at all. 
this is a surprising omission. that Act represents 
a substantial legal discontinuity. A cynic could 
say that the message is that serious law reform will 
slow down while ad hoe measures continue unimpeded. 
The harmonisation process can only go so far towards 
uniformity. Some of the limits arise from the 
political framework of the issue. The independence 
of the Australian states and the fact that New 
Zealand and Australia are separate countries ensure 
that complete uniformity will be very difficult to 
114 There is for instance, no substantive 
discussion in the Australian Law Journal for 
the period 1988-90. 
115 Sections 38 and 19. 
116 Section 44. 
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achieve. In competition law an areas where 
harmonisation is especially important given the role 
that law will play in regulating fair trade between 
the countries the Ministry of Commerce noted the 
importance of domestic market factors in the context 
of the countries different market threshold 
tests. 117 It said118 
Although on the face of it this results in 
differing levels of protection for traders 
depending on their direction of trade, in 
practice this is of limited significance. 
Both New Zealand and Australia have 
recently considered the thresholds for 
application of section 36 and section 46 
respectively. Both countries are of the 
view that their existing thresholds are 
appropriate to their domestic market 
circumstances and that, consistent with 
the principle that domestic companies and 
those of the other Member States should be 
treated equally within a free trade area, 
the same thresholds should also apply in 
the trans-Tasman context. 
This exercise - that uniformity is hard to achieve 
reflects the overseas experience. One writer 
suggests that perhaps it is human nature to change 
things and that it would be surprising if a law 
reform agency did not alter a piece of 
legislation. 119 This is perhaps borne out by the 
companies bill where the Justice Department were 
recently criticised for rewriting the Law Commission 
Draft Companies Bill120 line by line. 121 
117 Ministry of Commerce Reports and Decisions : 
Review of the Commerce Act 1986 Appendix 2, p2. 
118 Idem. 
119 Above n63, p431. 
120 Law Commission Report No. 9 Company Law Reform 
and Restatement. 
121 Dominion Sunday Times 14/11/90 p21 
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Competition law is an area where harmonisation is 
important. New Zealands Commerce Act 1986 was 
modelled on the Australian Trade Practices Act. the 
Steering Committee notes122 
Consequently in the competition law area 
the effective starting point can be said 
to be one of significant harmonisation. 
There are of course differences between 
the NZ Com Act and the ATPA which can be 
attributed largely to differences in 
constitutional arrangements, drafting 
style and policy objectives in each 
country. 
The Committee has drafted a legislative scheme to 
allow external competition law to anti-competitive 
trans-Tasman behaviour. 123 The identified ongoing 
task is "preserving and building on the very 
substantial degree of harmonisation which already 
exists. 11124 
The courts as well are pursuing harmony in the 
competition law area. In Apple & Pear Board v Apple 
Fields Limited125 Cooke P said126 
The wording of S43(i) is close to that of 
Sl(i) (b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 
of the Commonwealth of Australia, from 
which the provisions of our Commerce Act 
were largely copied ... 
Nevertheless, if there were a clear and 
settled body of Australian judicial 
authority laying down the meaning of 
"specifically", I should be strongly 
122 Above nl, p42. 
123 Which has resulted in legislative change. See 
The Commerce Amendment Act 1990. 
124 Above nl, p43. 
125 Apple & Pear Board v Apple Fields Ltd [1989] 3 
NZLR 158,164. 
126 Ibid. 
disposed to follow it. As mentioned more 
than once previously (for example in 
Dominion Rent A Car Limited v Budget Rent 
A Car Systems (1987] 2 NZLR 395,407; Vicom 
New Zealand Limited v Vicomm Systems 
Limited (1981] 2 NZLR 600,605; Taylor Bros 
Limited v Taylors Group Limited (1988] 2 
NZLR 1,39), I think that Australasian 
uniformity and reciprocity in commercial 
law are goals to be pursued by the Courts 
as well as the legislature. 
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A high degree of harmonisation in competition law is 
being pursued with a recognition of the 
inevitability of differences due to policy and 
market factors. 
Company Law however is an area where harmonisation 
might not be a concern. The Law Commission in 
Report No. 9 Company Law Reform and Restatement 
states that most of the responses to the discussion 
papers did not see core company law as a major 
harmonisation concern. 127 The report notes that 
"[i]t is difficult to see how divergence in core 
company law would affect trans-Tasman trade, 11128 and 
that harmonisation has never been taken to mean that 
the legislation in both countries must be 
identical." 12 9 The report notes that if the 
recommendations in it are accepted there will be a 
substantial difference between the countries in 
form, nevertheless "the essential elements of both 
jurisdictions will remain comparable. 11130 
The Steering Committee, however, anticipate future 
harmonisation of corporate law and notes that when 
the Corporations Act 1989 becomes law the 
127 Above n120, para 151. 
128 Above n120, para 152. 
129 Above n120, para 153. 
130 Above n120, para 153. 
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Commonwealth Parliament will have control of company 
legislation. 131 
Company Law is an area where harmonisation may not 
be an issue. The United States copes quite nicely 
with 'unharmonised' law. 
Nevertheless, it is not inconceivable that it might 
have to be addressed. Currently there is 'broad 
compatibility' which will remain with the passing of 
the new Acts. The Steering Committee refers to the 
dangers of 'backdoor incorporation' once one place 
of corporate registration is implemented. 132 The 
point is that if standards were too different, it 
would encourage the incorporation of a company in a 
country in order to do business in the other. That 
this is a concern reflects upon the stage reached in 
the overall relationship. In the United States the 
Delaware Corporations Act attracts considerable 
business to the State, and its lawyers, by the law 
level of corporate responsibility it requires. 133 
Nevertheless, at present this concern is effectively 
a constraint on 'disharmony'. It exists but is not 
of particular concern. The differences between 
company and competition illustrate that 
harmonisation will mean and require different things 
in different areas. 
The Steering Committee relied on transaction costs 
to suggest a high degree of harmonisation. Their 
report has been criticised for this. Jack Hodder as 
131 Above nl, para 7.04. 
132 One place of registration is seen as essential, 
see above nl, para 7.12. 
133 See above n71. 
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an editor of The Capital Letter said in response to 
the report that it134 
... proceeds on the basis that 
harmonisation is not just about removing 
impediments to trade but involves 
increasing 'compatibility' of laws to 
reduce transaction and compliance costs 
(para 4.03). In the absence of any real 
discussion of such costs, some may 
translate that as harmonisation for 
harmonisations sake. 
The report virtually assumes the importance of the 
costs and the benefits of removing them. However it 
is easy to doubt the importance of transaction 
costs. There has been no strong business lobby 
concerning them. Some business people are in favour 
of a degree of 'disharmony' as it provides 
incentives to trade. Lindsay Ferguson, Managing 
Director of Magnum Corporation, recently told a CER 
conference that there were serious dangers in many 
harmonisation proposals135 
Harmonisation kills trade. If labour 
costs, energy costs, regulatory costs and 
so forth, were identical across countries, 
there would be little basis for trade. 
The absence of a lobby from business undermines the 
importance of the transaction costs argument. 
Attempting to reduce transaction costs is made 
difficult by the impossibility of removing them 
completely. Differences will always exist for the 
unwary. The possibility of difference is sufficient 
to create a transaction cost. Unless the 
possibility of difference is removed then there will 
be costs involved in identifying what the 
134 See above n109. 
135 Evening Post 15/11/90, plO. 
differences, if any, are. The possibility of 
difference will exist as long as New Zealand and 
Australia are separate countries. 
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The Steering Committee note that "[t]he great bulk 
of companies incorporated in both countries may 
never be involved in business dealings across the 
Tasman. 11136 Just as there are businesses which will 
trade in the trans-Tasman market, some lawyers will 
develop expertise in dealing with the needs of such 
clients. This expertise and specialisation will 
with increased efficiencies lower transaction costs 
(or increase lawyers profits) and perhaps attract 
clients. The legal services market will respond and 
to an extent deal with the problem. 
Harmonisation depends on political will. It is 
Parliaments which will ultimately be responsible for 
changing the law. The overseas experience is that 
if the harmonisation process wanders into areas of 
little importance and demand, the political will can 
evaporate and the whole process can be 
marginalised. 137 If harmonisation is to be an 
ongoing process reflecting the broader New Zealand-
Australia economic relationship it is crucial that 
this does not happen. An attempt to purge 
transaction costs could result in the whole 
harmonisation process losing momentum. 
It must be borne in mind when considering the 
political will to harmonise that it is a question of 
Australian political will as well. Burnett notes 
that "New Zealand has considerable goodwill in 
Australia but no political leverage. The goodwill 
136 Above nl, para 7.17. 
137 See text accompanying notes 62-64. 
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can easily be expended. 11138 To avoid harmonisation 
becoming a one-way street where New Zealand law 
changes to assimilate, or try to, with Australian 
law care must be taken in choosing subjects for 
reform. 139 
There is also the question of what happens if a 
harmonisation reform works badly. If for instance 
business groups were to lobby against a reform or 
proposed reform and it were to become a 'political' 
issue. this again could adversely affect on-going 
harmonisation. 
138 A Burnett "ANZ Relations : CER in context Legal 
Research Foundation 1983, p71. 
139 See text accompanying notes 19-21. 
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TOWARDS A LIMITED CONCEPT OF HARMONISATION 
Harmonisation is a means to an end; not an end in 
itself. However, it is an ambiguous concept. The 
Steering Committee's Report identifies an equally 
nebulous objective for the harmonisation programme 
and then attacks transaction costs without any 
examination of them. The Report has been criticised 
for losing sight of the 'instrumental' nature of 
harmonisation. 140 
Harmonisation is unlikely to affect trade much. The 
leading proponent of free trade does not see it as 
important to achieving free trade. 141 There appears 
to be little demand for harmonisation from the 
business community. In light of this and the role 
of harmonisation, a limited concept is called for. 
The objective of the Agreement is something more 
than merely free trade; but the core of the 
Agreement is free trade. Similarly the objective of 
business law harmonisation is something more than 
the removal of impediments to free trade; but the 
removal (and prevention) of impediments is at its 
core. 
Harmonisation should continue to be a major 
imperative in on-going law reform in both countries. 
A limited concept which deals with real rather than 
presumed or imagined problems, is the best way to 
avoid the whole process being marginalised. An 
over-emphasis on transaction costs may reduce 
political enthusiasm towards the programme. At 
present there is, at least in New Zealand, 
considerable enthusiasm about harmonisation. This 
140 See above n134. 
141 See above n84. 
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enthusiasm could turn to disenchantment if there are 
unrealistic expectations which are not met. 
Expecting harmonisation to result in a 'mutually 
beneficial commercial environment' is unrealistic. 
Government policy is far more important to achieving 
this than law. Overall the question of how far the 
relationship will go is a question for the 
governments. The well spring of the harmonisation 
programme in the original Agreement, Article 22 S(c) 
notes that harmonisation is 'to reflect the stage 
reached in the closer economic relationship". An 
extensive programme focusing on transaction costs in 
pursuit of efficiency might take the legal 
harmonisation ahead of the general relationship. A 
strong indication of the Government's approach to 
harmonisation was given by Trade Negotiations 
Minister, Philip Burdon, to the Australia-New 
Zealand Business Council. 142 A report of the speech 
said 
Mr Burdon told the Australia-New Zealand 
Business Council in Christchurch yesterday 
that the review (of the Agreement in 1992) 
would look at the remaining impediments to 
trade and economic relations between the 
two countries. 
Tax, tariff harmonisation and business law 
- let alone currency alignment - could 
have a great impact on the way New 
Zealanders did business. 
New Zealand had no need to be afraid of 
those issues but they had to be approached 
with care 
Mr Burdon said that the Government had to 
ask what were the impediments, but also 
what would be the cost of removing them. 
What was in New Zealand's interests? 
"I am only too aware that the removal of 
impediments could lead to quite 
142 Evening Post Wellington 15/11/90, plO. 
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unacceptable costs, and costs in terms of 
our economic and political sovereignty. 
Harmonisation will not, for me, be a goal 
in itself without careful analysis of the 
costs as well as the undoubted benefits." 
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Which suggests a careful view of harmonisation. It 
also suggests caution about the wider implications 
of CER. CER has caused New Zealanders to look 
critically at New Zealand's future and the 
importance and value of our 'independent' place in 
the world. The answer to those questions has large 
implications for harmonisation. Harmonisation could 
become a one way street. New Zealand at the end of 
the day can simply change its law much more easily 
than Australia. If the only way to achieve 
'harmony' is through a unilateral change in New 
Zealand's law, should it be done? The answer to 
this depends on the values placed on harmonisation 
and on what perhaps amounts to 'Kiwi pride'. 
The writers opinion is that the question should be 
'what is best for New Zealand?' If there are 
identified benefits for New Zealand flowing from 
harmonisation to reduce transaction costs the 
importance of benefits may transcend the value of 
rugged independence and in the long term provide for 
independence to be maintained. 
At the same time, it is easy to be critical of the 
transaction cost or business efficiency argument. 
It seems to be an argument made easily in the 
abstract but harder to substantiate. 
A limited view of harmonisation would involve 
significant areas being involved for harmonisation. 
Competition law in particular and the law relating 
to takeovers are areas where a high degree of 
harmonisation would be appropriate. In respect of a 
lot of areas there is already 'broad compatibility'. 
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Lawyers from both sides of the Tasman talk the same 
language and deal with the same concepts thanks to 
the common law heritage. 143 New Zealand and 
Australia have the sort of harmony which when 
achieved in the United States was called a 
remarkable achievement. 144 It may be hard to 
advance on this. 
Harmonisation should not slow down the more general 
law reform. It should be taken into account in law 
reform and may provide impetus for reform. New 
Zealand and Australia should continue to look to the 
best models for reform on offer and not be 
restricted to the other countries initiatives or 
current law. 
Harmonisation can be a very positive thing. It 
could end up bringing the lawyers and legal 
institutions closer together - particularly if 
professional requirements are harmonised (and its 
hard to see why they should not be) - than the laws 
of the countries. 145 This would be extremely 
positive and would of itself improve efficiencies 
and lower transaction costs. It would be precisely 
the sort of strengthening of the general Australia 
New Zealand relationship that was one of the 
Agreement's objectives. 
A limited approach is in keeping with the Agreement 
and the Memorandum. It has the further advantage of 
being much more likely to work. A high degree of 
harmonisation will be difficult to achieve. 
143 Above n78, p436. 
144 Above n77. 
145 This is of course already happending. A good 
example is the setting up of a liaison 
committee to examine harmonisation by the 
Australasian Law Reform Agencies Conference. 
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Australia's states will see to that. A limited 
concept of harmonisation will ultimately prove to be 
the better view simply because it is the most that 
can be achieved. When it is also satisfying the 
objectives of the Agreement and comes with the least 
costs, it is by far the more attractive view. 
This limited approach would provide clear goals to 
the harmonisation programme. Without clear goals 
much effort could be wasted due to the ambiguity of 
the concept. The pursuit of business efficiency 
could paradoxically lead to law reform inefficiency. 
A limited approach would not eschew transaction 
costs but rather than attempting to identify and 
deal with them immediately, would favour a gradual 
approach and deal with such discontinuities as they 
became problems. 
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CONCLUSION 
Harmonisation is a concept which has been discussed 
in several jurisdictions. It's an elusive concept 
and a difficult goal. European experience suggests 
that a relatively low level of business law 
harmonisation is necessary for the functioning of a 
common market. The CER relationship is a free trade 
area between two countries with similar legal 
systems and a common legal history. There is 
already a high degree of harmonisation and with 
careful measured progress, the objectives of the 
Agreement could easily have been met. 
The harmonisation of law question could perhaps have 
been easily resolved. However the bilateral 
Steering Committee focused on an unclear goal and 
concerned itself with transaction costs. The 
Committee did so on the basis that a high degree of 
harmonisation could significantly enhance trade. 
This appears unlikely. Trade increases result from 
general economic conditions and policies and 
business having the d~sire and confidence to use 
opportunities open to it. Law can impede this but 
of itself cannot improve trade in the face of low 
business confidence. 
The Steering Committee focus on efficiency may have 
been based on an ideological commitment. The 
pursuit of efficiency sometimes seems to breed a 
religious zeal all of its own. 
Harmonisation should be a means and not an end. Sir 
Kenneth has said that146 
146 Sir Kenneth keith address to the Legal Research 
Foundation "Reforming the Law'' 23 November 
1989, pa. 
[W]e should not be mesmerised by the mere 
incantation of the acronyms. CER does not 
mean that there must be one law in all 
areas for the whole of Australia and New 
Zealand. The Australian states would 
resist any such interpretation. It will 
often be the case that great differences 
in our law (and indeed within Australia) 
can remain consistently with the purposes 
of promoting and enhancing trade. 
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New Zealand and Australia are independent countries 
with different concerns and policies. The law 
should be able to reflect differences. 
A limited approach is in accordance with the role of 
law in free trade agreements and both the CER 
Agreement and the Memorandum of Understanding. 
There is another review of business law in 1992. By 
then, perhaps the issues will have become clearer. 
A limited approach will provide the certainty and 
clarify necessary to ensure that the harmonisation 
process is ongoing, certain and consistent. It is 
important that there is careful progress and not a 
brief enthusiastic flurry or ad hoe responses. 
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